OBRAS ON-LINE DE JORGE VICENTE ARREGUI
The paper focuses on Wittgensteinian criticism of the
epistemological approach of the study of emotions that
was begun by Descartes. Wittgenstein distinguishes, as
Aristotle did, between matter and form of emotions, and
he maintains that emotions and physiological reactions
are not two different events, but only one which can be
described in two different ways.
Anuario filosófico 28-2, Pamplona 1995
This paper attempts to establish an articulation of
ethics, logic and philosophy of psychology in the
Tractatus. After showing the ethical purpose of the
Tractatus, his picture theory of meaning, and his
philosophy of psychology –stressing the role of
projection– Arregui sets himself the task of
analyzing the mystical. His insistence on projection
allows him to underline the function of the
transcendental subject and, therefore, to offer an
interpretation of the texts about the mystical,
different to the usual ones.
Anuario filosófico 26-2, Pamplona 1993. This paper
shows the importance of the topic of personal identity
in both analytical and continental tradition. Makes a
general approach of the subject and explains the
relevance of the other articles of this number of
Anuario Filosófico.
Anuario Filosófico, 1994 (27), 35-58 Resumen: This
paper discusses the relevance in Ethics of the notion
of human being. It distinguishes between the sphere of
real moral moral practices and the philosophical
foundation of such practices. It discusses also the
difference bet-ween the modern concept of person and
that of human being and establishes their role in moral
thought. Finally, it focuses on the classical concept
of person.
Anuario Filosófico, 1997 (30), 353-360 Resumen: After
Wittgenstein’s criticism of foundationalism, it
is common use to defend the prevalence of action or of
practical reason over the theoretical outlook at the
world. The substitution of human praxis in the world
for a set of self-evident propositions as foundations
of theoretical knowledge seems to imply a radical form
of pragmatism. Against this view, and recording some
ideas of Vico, the paper claims that the rebuttal of
Descartes’ epistemological theory of the
spectator does not imply any kind of pragmatism.
Anuario Filosófico 23/1 (1990) 163-176.